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A PROBLEM FOR INFORMATION THEORETIC SEMANTICS ~ 
ABSTRACT. Information theoretic semantics proposes to construe predicate reference in 
terms of nomologicaI relations between distal properties and properties of representational 
mental events. Research on the model has largely concentrated on the problem of choosing 
the nomological relation in terms of which distal properties are to be singled out. I argue 
that, in addition to this, an information theoretic account has to provide a specification of 
which properties of representational mental events will play arole in determining reference, 
qua bearers of nomological relations. I contend that this task poses a serious additional 
challenge to the viability of the model. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
When I judge that my car is dirty, my judgment may or may not be 
satisfied by my car. Which of the two is the case depends on whether 
my car fulfils a certain condition that my dirtiness-judgment imposes on 
objects. It is natural to think that what plays the role of this condition 
is a property, whose presence in, or absence fi'om my car, or any other 
object, will determine whether my judgment is satisfied by it. Let me 
refer to these judgments in which a property is ascribed to an object as 
predicative judgments. And let me speak of the property (or properties) I 
whose instantiation conditions determine the satisfaction conditions of a 
predicative judgment as the property (or properties) expressed 2 by it, and 
of the relation between each judgment and the property (or properties) that 
it expresses as the expression relation. 
Jerry Fodor has chosen this relation as the point at which to break 
into the circle of semantic notions. 3 The relation between a predicative 
judgment and the property that it expresses i no doubt a semantic relation. 
But for a naturalist like Fodor, if it is a teal relation, it cannot be irreducibly 
semantic. It has to be possible to specify in non-semantic, non-intentional 
terms how a predicative judgment would have to be related to a property 
in order for the former to express the latter. 4 1 shall refer to this kind of 
account of the expression relation as a naturalization ofthe notion. Fodor's 
recent work on the theory of content has been largely devoted to providing 
this kind of account. 5 
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Fodor's approach to the task is shaped by two main features. The first 
feature of his approach to the task that I want o highlight is the involvement 
of the Language of Thought in his account of the expression relation. In 
Fodor's picture, predicative judgments are tokens, of a certain kind, 6 of 
predicates of an inner language. These predicates play a crucial role in 
his account of the expression relation. It is to Mentalese predicates, not 
to predicative judgments, that distal properties are primarily assigned] 
The expression relation is supposed to emerge from this assignment: a 
predicative judgment j expresses a property P just in case P has been 
assigned to the Mentalese predicate tokened by j. This means that the 
question whether apredicative judgment expresses a property P has to be 
answered in two steps. First, we need to determine which of the properties 
that j instantiates i  the property of tokening a Mentalese predicate. Then 
we need to determine whether this property bears a certain relation to R An 
account of the expression relation along these lines would be an instance 
of the following schema: 
(1) For every predicative judgment j and property R j expresses P 
iff R(fG), e), 
where f is the function that assigns to each predicative judgment the Men- 
talese predicate that it tokens, and R is a relation specified in non-semantic, 
non-intentional terms. 
This feature of Fodor's approach can be analysed into two different 
claims. First, we have the claim that the expression relation has to be 
construed in terms of a relation between distal properties and a certain 
kind of properties of predicative judgments. Second, we have the claim 
that each of the latter properties is to be thought of as the property of 
tokening a predicate of the Language of Thought / I  want to leave aside 
the second claim and concentrate on the first one. We can characterise the 
first claim as the idea that an account of the expression relation would have 
to take the following form: 
(2) For every predicative judgment j and property P, j expresses P 
iff there is a property Q such that Q(j), S(Q), and R(Q, P), 
where S is a second order property that singles out the properties of 
each predicative judgment with respect o which distal properties will 
be assigned to it, and R is a relation between S-properties and distal prop- 
erties. In the Language of Thought version of (2), S would be the property 
of being a Mentalese predicate. In this version, a predicative judgment j 
that tokens Mentalese predicate M would express aproperty P just in case 
P is R-related to the property of tokening M. 
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In general, we can think of S as a criterion for selecting which of 
the properties of a predicative judgment play a role in singling out the 
distal property that it expresses. Hence, I shall refer to S as the semantic 
relevance criterion, and to the S-properties of a predicative judgment as its 
semantically relevant properties. In the Language of Thought version of 
the model, each predicative judgment has exactly one semantically relevant 
property: the property of tokening acertain Mentalese predicate. 
Needless to say, if an instance of (2) is to provide a naturalization of
the expression relation, both the semantic relevance criterion S and the 
relation R that assigns distal properties to S-properties will have to be 
specified in non-semantic, non-intentional terms. I shall refer to the claim 
that a naturalization of the expression relation will have to be an instance 
of (2) as the semantic relevance (SR) claim. 
The second feature of Fodor's approach on which I wish to focus is 
his commitment to information theoretic semantics. 9 The basic tenet of 
information theoretic semantics i the idea that the property expressed by 
each predicative judgment will be singled out in terms of a nomological 
relation. The following considerations make this thought compelling. A
predicative judgment is an event in the physical world, presumably in 
the subject's nervous ystem] ° In some cases, the event consisting in a 
predicative judgment is caused by an event consisting in the perceptual 
(e.g. visual) presentation of the object of predication, e.g., when looking 
at my car prompts me to judge that it is dirty. It is natural to think of this 
scenario as in some sense fundamental] I In these cases, there will be a 
causal chain of events connecting the event consisting in the presentation 
of the object with the event consisting in the predicative judgment, via the 
effect of the presentation f the object on the subject's ensory transducers. 
These causal relations will be governed by laws. The basic intuition of 
the information theoretic approach is that the property expressed by each 
predicative judgment can be singled out in terms of these laws. I shall refer 
to the claim that the expression relation will have to be specified in this 
manner as the information theoretic (IT) claim. 
For someone who holds SR, IT would have to be understood asimposing 
a restriction on the kind of relation that can be xpected to play the role of 
R in (2): it will have to be a nomological relation. Hence, for someone who 
holds both claims, a predicative judgment j will express aproperty P just 
in case P bears a cel~ain omological relation to an S-property ofj. This is 
indeed the shape that Fodor's proposals have taken. In each of them, the 
property expressed by each predicative judgment has been singled out as 
the bearer of a nomic relation to the Mentalese predicate that it tokens.12 
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SR and IT may seem prima facie independent of one another. Thus 
it seems possible to think, on the one hand, that the expression relation 
should arise from a relation R between distal properties and a certain kind of 
properties of predicative judgments, but that R need not be a nomic relation. 
On the other hand, it seems that one could try to single out the property 
expressed by each predicative judgment as the bearer of a nomic relation, 
without having to single out some of the properties of each predicative 
judgment as its semantically relevant properties. However, I am going to 
argue that the latter is not true. I shall contend that the only viable way of 
specifying the expression relation along the lines of information theoretic 
semantics is by means of an instance of schema (2) in which a nomic 
relation is substituted for R. 
Then I shall focus on a difficulty for information theoretic semantics that 
derives from this fact. Notice that finding an adequate instance of schema 
(2) would involve two tasks. First, one would have to specify the relation 
R that assigns distal properties to S-properties. Second, one would have 
to specify the semantic relevance criterion - the second-order p operty S 
that singles out the semantically relevant properties of each predicative 
judgment. 
Most work in information theoretic semantics has been devoted to the 
first of these two tasks - to finding the nomological relation in terms of 
which the property expressed by each predicative judgment can be singled 
out. In this paper, I am going to focus on the second task. I shall contend 
that an acceptable semantic relevance criterion may prove hard to find, and 
hence that finding the right nomic relation is not the only significant hurdle 
that an information theoretic account of the expression relation would have 
to overcome. 
The problem arises from the fact hat, as I shall argue in Sections 4 
and 5, a plausible semantic relevance criterion must have the resources 
for ascribing to predicative judgments properties that are disjunctive from 
a neurological point of view. This forces the proponent of the model to 
provide an account of which disjunctions are to play this role in each 
case. The most promising approach to this task is to invoke the functional 
roles played by neural properties. But, as I shall argue in Section 6, neural 
properties can be expected to realize a number of functional roles. Hence 
construing the semantic relevance criterion in terms of functional roles 
would involve providing an account of which functional roles are to be 
treated as semantically relevant. In Section 7 1 consider some of the diffi- 
culties that may make this account hard to achieve. But before we turn to 
the problems faced by the task of construing the semantic relevance crite- 
rion, we need to spend some time making sure that the task is unavoidable 
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- that an information theoretic account of the expression relation cannot 
succeed unless it imposes a restriction on which properties of each pred- 
icative judgment are to be treated as semantically relevant. This will be the 
burden of Sections 2 and 3. 
2. INFORMATION THEORETIC SEMANTICS AND THE DISJUNCTION PROBLEM 
The most immediate challenge for the proponent of an information theo- 
retic approach to the naturalization f the expression relation is to find the 
specific taw that will single out the properties expressed by each predicative 
judgment. Fodor presents the problems confronted by this task by consid- 
ering the difficulties faced by a crude proposal as to which nomological 
relation will serve this purpose] 3 In his presentation fthe crude proposa!, 
he presupposes that predicative judgments are tokens, of a certain kind, of 
Mentalese predicates. Let f be the function that assigns to each predicative 
judgment the Mentalese predicate that it tokens. Then, according to the 
crude proposal, the naturalization of the expression relation would have to 
take this form: 
(3) For every predicative judgment j and property R j expresses P 
iff it is a law that Ps cause tokenings of f(j). 
Fodor argues convincingly that this proposal is unsatisfactory. The reason 
is what has come to be known as the disjunction problem. Consider the 
Mentalese predicate that is tokened whenever I judge of an object that it 
is a horse. A satisfactory account of the expression relation would have to 
treat he property horse 14 as the (only) property expressed by a predicative 
judgment of mine that tokens Mentalese "horse". But according to (3), 
these judgments express whatever property is nomically sufficient to cause 
Mentalese "horse" to be tokened. Hence (3) would yield an acceptable 
account of what properties are expressed by these judgments just in case 
horse is the only property that is nomically sufficient o cause tokenings 
of Mentalese "horse". But this is not so. By hypothesis, "horse" is tokened 
whenever I judge of something that it is a horse. But I occasionally judge 
wrongly that something is a horse. I may judge, e.g, of a cow, that i  is a 
horse, and hence "horse" would be tokened as an effect of a presentation 
of a cow, if the angle, the lighting conditions, my lack of attention, or 
any other factor makes me take the cow for a horse. But these deviant 
tokenings of "horse" will also be governed by laws. Thus, if cows that 
look like horses would cause "horse" to be tokened, the property horsy- 
looking-cow is also nomically sufficient o cause "horse" to be tokened. 
Hence, we would have to conclude that my predicative judgments that 
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token "horse" express, not just the property horse, but also horsy-looking- 
cow, or rather the disjunctive property horse or horsy-looking-cow. 
The problem for the crude proposal seems to arise from the fact that the 
criteria by which it singles out distal properties aren't restrictive nough. 
According to (3), the tokenings of a Mentalese predicate M express every 
property that is nomically sufficient to cause M to be tokened. But we 
have seen that many properties that satisfy this criterion could not be 
expressed by tokenings of M. Thus what the proponent of the information 
theoretic approach needs is a nomic relation that Mentalese predicates bear 
to fewer properties - only to those properties that their tokenings express. 
In our example, we need that relation to link "horse" to horse, but not o 
horsy-looking-cow. 
Fodor presents a number of influential proposals as to how to circumvent 
this difficulty as following a common pattern) 5 The idea is to bring into 
the picture a set of conditions C, and to treat as the property expressed by 
tokenings of a Mentalese predicate M, not every property that is nomically 
sufficient to cause M to be tokened, but only those that are nomically 
sufficient o cause M to be tokened under C-conditions. Thus the idea 
would be to replace (3) by the following schema: 
(4) For every predicative judgment j and property R j expresses P 
iff it is a law that Ps cause tokenings of f(j) under C-conditions. 
C-conditions would have to be chosen in such a way as to filter out unwant- 
ed distal properties. Thus, in our example, we would want horse, but 
not horsy-looking-cow, to be nomically sufficient o cause "horse" to be 
tokened under C-conditions. 
Fodor claims that his most recent information theoretic account of the 
expression relation does not follow this pattern. 16 Be this as it may, in what 
follows I shall focus on proposals that invoke a nomic relation of this form. 
However, my main points will not obviously depend on this stipulation- 
and they may turn out to be more widely applicable. 
3. INFORMATION THEORETIC SEMANTICS AND THE SEMANTIC RELEVANCE 
CRITERION 
My goal in this section is to argue that an information theoretic account of 
the expression relation that invokes this kind of nomological relation (it is 
a law that Ps cause Qs under C-conditions) would also have to invoke a 
semantic relevance criterion. In other words, I am going to argue that such 
an account would have to take the following form: 
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(5) For every predicative judgment j and property R j expresses P 
iff there is a property Q such that Q(j), S(Q), and it is a law that 
Ps cause Qs under C-conditions. 
Notice that (4) is an instance of (5), in which the unique S-property of 
each predicative judgment is the property of tokening acertain Mentalese 
predicate. 
That properties of predicative judgments have to be involved in an 
information theoretic account of the expression relation shou!d be beyond 
any doubt. One might be tempted to replace (5) by 
(6) For every predicative judgment j and property P, j expresses P 
iff it is a law that Ps cause j under C-conditions. 
But this, as it stands, does not constitute an intelligible proposal. Prop- 
erties, not particulars, are the proper bearers of nomological relations. A
causal law can connect particular events only insofar as they instantiate he 
properties that the law connects. The only way to take (6) as an intelligible 
proposal would be to read it as 
(7) For every predicative judgment j and property R j expresses P 
iff there is a property Q such that Q(j) and it is a law that Ps 
cause Qs under C-conditions. 
Thus, according to this approach, a predicative judgment j will express 
any property that bears the right nomic relation to one of the properties 
thatj instantiates. (7), unlike (6), singles out the properties expressed by a 
predicative judgment j as the bearers of a nomic relation to properties ofj. 
But, unlike (5), it imposes no restriction on which ofj's properties can play 
this role. (7) construes the expression relation without invoking a semantic 
relevance criterion. According to (7), the semantically relevant properties 
of a predicative judgment are all the properties that it instantiates. 
I want to argue that this featme renders any instance of (7) unsuitable 
as an account of the expression relation. The problem has to do with the 
fact that a predicative judgment, as any other particular, can be expected 
to instantiate a large number of propertiesJ 7 Each of the properties that a 
predicative judgment instantiates will bear various nomologicat relations 
to other properties. In particulal, for every property Q that a predicative 
judgment instantiates, there may be a distal property that is nomically 
sufficient o cause Q to be instantiated. Bringing in C-conditions won't 
alter this situation. Predicative judgments that occur under C-conditions 
can also be expected to instantiate many properties, and we cannot rule 
out the possibility that many of them will have distal properties that are 
nomically sufficient to cause them to be instantiated. 
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According to (7), a predicative judgment j would express every property 
that is nomically sufficient to cause one of the properties ofj to be instanti- 
ated under C-conditions. Hence, (7) doesn't make room for the possibility 
that a predicative judgment j has a property Q such that some distal property 
P is nomically sufficient to cause Q to be instantiated under C-conditions, 
but j does not express P. (7) cannot accommodate the possibility that some 
of the properties of a predicative judgment are semantically irrelevant, hat 
they are mere noise from a semantic point of view. I am going to argue that 
this is unacceptable. I shall contend that a plausible account of the expres- 
sion relation has to make room for semantically irrelevant properties of 
predicative judgments. 
Let's suppose that the properties of predicative judgments that should 
be treated as semantically relevant are as salient as they could possibly be. 
Suppose that things inside someone's head are literally the way Fodor, fol- 
lowing Schiffer, describes them metaphorically. 18 This subject has inside 
her head a tiny box marked "Belief Box". When she makes a predicative 
judgment, an inscription of a predicate is thrown into this box. Let's waive 
questions concerning which object is the object of predication i each case. 
Let's suppose also that the inscriptions that go into the box are English 
predicates, with subscripts as needed to remove ambiguities. 
According to intbrmation theoretic semantics, one of these inscriptions 
would express aproperty P just in case there is a property Q of the inscrip- 
tion such that P is nomically sufficient to cause an i scription with woperty 
Q to go into the belief box under C-conditions. The question that we need 
to ask is whether we have to impose any restrictions on which properties 
of each inscription can play this role in singling out the properties that it 
expresses. I want to suggest that if no restrictions are imposed, the resulting 
account of the expression relation would be utterly unsatisfactory. 
Suppose that our subject judges of an object hat she is observing that it 
is a horse. Her making this judgment consists in an inscription ofthe word 
"horse" going into the belief box. Suppose also that the property horse is 
nomically sufficient to cause a "horse"-inscription to go into the belief box 
under C-conditions. Then, if being a "horse"-inscription is a semantically 
relevant property of the inscription, it will express the property horse, as 
desired. But her regimented Mental English also contains the predicate 
"hornet", and inscriptions of this predicate go into the belief box whenever 
she judges of something that it is a hornet. If the information theoretic 
account is going to come out fight for inscriptions of this word also, the 
property hornet will have to be nomically sufficient o cause a "hornet"- 
inscription to go into the belief box under C-conditions. 
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But notice that "horse"-inscriptions and "hornet"-inscriptions have at 
least one property in common: both are inscriptions tarting with the 
sequence "h"A"o'A"r". Moreover, it follows from what we have said that 
both the property horse and the property hornet are nomicalty sufficient 
to cause an inscription starting with the sequence "h"A"o"~'"r '' to go into 
the belief box. Hence, if every property of an inscription is semantically 
relevant, we would not be able to say that "horse"-inscriptions express 
horse, but not hornet, and that "hornet"-inscriptions express hornet, but 
not horse. We would be forced to conclude that each "horse"-inscription 
and each "homet"-inscription expresses the disjunctive property horse or 
hornet. 
There are some structural similarities between this problem and the dis- 
junction problem. In both cases, the difficulty takes the form of unwanted 
distal properties (horsy-looking-cow, or hornet) being assigned to a pred- 
icative judgment by an inadequate account of the expression relation. But 
the source of the difficulty is different in each case. The disjunction prob- 
lem is created by a nomological relation that links the property of tokening 
"horse" with a distal property (horsy-looking-cow) that isn't expressed by 
tokens of "horse". The present problem, by contrast, arises even if we have 
succeeded in identifying a nomological relation that connects the property 
of tokening "horse" only to the property horse. The problem arises from 
the fact that this nomological relation connects another property of tokens 
of "horse" (the property of starting with the sequence "h"/~"o"A"r ") with 
a property (hornet) that isn't expressed by them. The problem is created, 
not by our choice of a nomological relation, but by the lack of restrictions 
on which properties of a predicative judgment are to be treated as singling 
out, qua bearers of a nomological relation, the distal properties that the 
judgment expresses. 
We have to conclude that in order to have a plausible information 
theoretic account of the expression relation, even in these unrealistically 
favourable circumstances, we need to impose some restrictions on which 
properties of each predicative judgment should count as semantically rele- 
vant. In addition to finding the nomological relation that wi!l do the job, an 
information theoretic account of the expression relation would have to find 
a semantic relevance criterion. It would have to tell us, in non-semantic, 
non-intentional terms, which properties of each predicative jud~nent are 
fit for semantic duties. In other words, an instance of (7) could not pro- 
vide a plausible account of the expression relation. Only a (non-trivial) 19 
instance of (5) could do the job. 
Of course, in the situation that we have envisaged, formulating a seman- 
tic relevance criterion wouldn't be very hard. The semantically relevant 
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property of each inscription would be the property" of containing exactly a 
certaln sequence of letters. But needless to say, things are bound to be much 
messier in real life. Predicative judgments are unlikely to be inscriptions 
of English predicates going into a box. More likely, they will be neural 
events of some sort, and deciding which properties of each of them should 
be counted as semantically relevant is bound to prove trickier. In the rest 
of this paper I am going to argue that the task will be very difficult indeed. 
I shall look in some detail at the standard strategy for accomplishing this 
task, and argue that it faces serious obstacles. 
4. NEURAL PROPERTIES 
When I judge that my car is dirty, a number of neural events take place 
in my brain. On the information theoretic account, my judgment will be 
identical with one of these neural events, and the property that it expresses 
will be singled out as the bearer of a nomological relation to some of the 
properties of this neural event. Suppose that we have determined which 
neural event is identical with my predicative judgment. As we have seen 
in the previous section, if we count all the properties of this event as 
semantically relevant, we are bound to end up with an implausible account 
of the expression relation. Hence, we need to find a criterion for deciding 
which of the properties of this event are to be counted as semantically 
relevant. 
My judgment being a neural event, it is natural to think that its semanti- 
cally relevant properties will be found among its neural properties. Accord- 
ing to this proposal, the semantic relevance criterion will appoint as the 
semantically relevant properties of each predicative judgment some of its 
neural properties. In this section, I want to argue that such an account 
of the semantic relevance criterion is unlikely to result in an acceptable 
naturalization of the expression relation. 
The question that I propose to consider is whether we can expect hat 
any of the neural events that take place when I make a predicative judgment 
will instantiate a neural property that bears the right sort of nomological 
relation to the property expressed by the judgment. Notice that an affirma- 
tive answer to this question will not suffice for establishing the viability 
of the approach that takes neural properties as semantically relevant. It's 
not enough that the right properties be there. The viability of the approach 
would also require that we have a non-semantic, non-intentional specifi- 
cation of which neural properties are to be treated as semantically relevant 
in each case. 
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However, a negative answer to the question would suffice for estab- 
lishing that this approach cannot succeed. If we cannot expect hat each 
predicative judgment wilt involve the instantiation of a neural property 
that bears the right nomological relation to the property expressed by the 
judgment, his approach is bound to fall. I am going to argue that this is in 
fact the case. I shall contend that we have no good reasons for assuming 
that every predicative judgment will involve the instantiation of a neural 
property suitable for the job. 
I shall start by describing a situation in which no neural property with the 
desired features eems to be present. Let's focus again on the predicative 
judgments that make the information theoretic approach most compelling: 
predicative judgments hat are caused by a visual presentation f the object 
of predication. Among these, I propose to further estrict our attention to 
judgments that cause (sincere) utterances of English predicates, s° Thus a 
visual presentation fmy car might prompt me to judge it to be dirty, and I 
may express this judgment with an utterance of "dirty". In this case, we can 
expect hat there will be a causal chain of events leading from the visual 
presentation fmy car to my utterance of "dirty", via a retinal stimulation 
and a sequence of neural events. In these cases, my judgment will have 
to be one of the neural events along this causal chain, and our search for 
semantically relevant properties can be restricted to the neural properties 
instantiated by these events. 
Consider Mary, a fairly standard English speaker, whose use of English 
words isn't noticeably different from that of other speakers of the language. 
In particular, there is nothing strange about her use of the predicate "red": 
she applies it to the objects o which the rest of us, in her situation, would 
apply it, and her use of the predicate is equally standard in all other espects. 
So much so that no one has ever doubted that she means red by "red" - 
that each of her utterances of "red" expresses a judgment that is satisfied 
precisely by red things. 
But one day Mary's nervous ystem is examined by a team of super- 
neurologists, who make the following surprising discovery. It turns out 
that the perception of dark red objects and the p rception of light red 
objects have totally different effects on Mary's nervous ystem. The neural 
processes triggered by dark red objects are fairly uniform, and so are the 
neural processes triggered by light red objects. But the former processes 
have absolutely nothing to do with the latter. In fact, the difference between 
these two kinds of process is so huge that no single neural property is 
instantiated by both - no property, that is, that isn't instantiated also by 
many other kinds of process. 
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Such huge differences are to be found, in particular, between the pro- 
cesses that lead from the presentation of a dark red object o an utterance 
of "red", and those that lead from the presentation of a light red object o 
an utterance of the same predicate type. Hence no single neural property 
will be instantiated in the causal ancestry of all of Mary's utterances of 
"red". Many neural properties will be instantiated in the causal ancestry 
of all her utterances of "red" caused by dark red objects, and many others 
by all her utterances of the predicate caused by light red objects. What we 
won't find is a neural property instantiated in the causal ancestry of both 
kinds of utterance of the predicate. 
This means, of course, that if we look for semantically relevant prop- 
erties among the neural properties in the causal ancestry of each predicate 
utterance, we won't be able to assign the same semantically relevant prop- 
erty to all the judgments that Mary expresses with utterances of "red" - 
to her "red"-judgments, asI shall call them. At best, we could assign the 
same semantically relevant property to all of her "red'-judgments caused 
by dark red objects, and another one to all of her "red"-judgments caused 
by light red objects. 
One could argue, correctly, that this result does not establish the invia- 
bility of this approach. Judgments that are assigned ifferent semantically 
relevant properties could still turn out to express the same property, since 
different neural properties could bear the right nomological relation to the 
same distal property. Thus even if we could not assign the same semanti- 
cally relevant properties to all of Mary's "red"-judgments, it is still possible 
that they will all be assigned red as the property that they express. This 
would be so if red turns out to be nomically sufficient to cause the seman- 
tically relevant neural properties of all these judgments to be instantiated 
under C-conditions. 
But this remark doesn't offer much solace to the proponent of this 
approach. The reason is that we cannot expect that any of the neural 
properties instantiated in the causal ancestry of Mary's utterances of "red" 
will stand in the right nomic relation to red. Take the neural processes 
that lead to Mary's utterances of "red" from the presentation of dark red 
objects. I want to suggest hat there is no reason to expect hat any of 
the properties instantiated in these processes will stand in the right nomic 
relation to the property red. For any plausible account of C-conditions, if
Mary were presented with a light red object under C-conditions, none of 
those properties would be instantiated. Only the presentation of a dark red 
object would have this effect. Hence it is with dark red, and not with red, 
that we should expect these properties to be nomically connected. 
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Thus we have to conclude that if we let the semantic relevance criterion 
assign to Mary's "red"-judgments neural properties, we are likely to end 
up with an account of the expression relation according to which "red", 
as meant by Mary, is an ambiguous predicate. Some of her utterances 
express judgments that are satisfied by dark red things and others express 
judgments that are satisfied by light red things. None of them would express 
a judgment that is satisfied by both dark and light red things. 
Let's now consider how this result bears on the plausibility of this 
approach to the definition of the semantic relevance criterion. The question 
that we need to ask is whether we can accept an account of the expression 
relation according to which someone with Mary's neural make-up cannot 
express, with her utterances of "red", judgments that are satisfied precisely 
by red things, even if her use of the predicate is in all respects indistin- 
guishable from ours. I want to suggest that this question has to be answered 
in the negative. The reason is not that our pre-theoretical scriptions of sat- 
isfaction conditions couldn't ever be overridden by a scientific account of 
the notion. The reason is rather that we would want the notion of judgment 
satisfaction to enjoy a degree of independence from speakers' hardwiring 
that this approach wouldn't allow for. 
There are two different ways in which one may try to defend the neuraI 
approach to defining the s mantic relevance criterion in the face of cases 
like Mary's. One possible strategy would be to argue that the case is 
impossible, because someone with that kind of neural constitution wouldn't 
be capable of using "red" the way it is used by those who mean red by 
the predicate. In particular, the claim would go, such aperson wouldn't be 
capable of applying "red" (under normal circumstances) precisely to red 
objects. 
This claim is plainly wrong. It is true that the way in which an organism 
is hardwired limits the ways in which it can learn to attune its behaviour to 
features of its environment. On the one hand, an organism could not learn 
to react to the presence in the environment of a feature that its perceptual 
devices cannot detect. Thus consider an organism with black and white 
vision, i.e., one on whose cognitive devices reflected light of a given 
intensity has always the same effect, no matter what colour it has. This 
organism could not learn to display a certain behaviour precisely when a 
red object is present. In particular, it couldn't learn to utter "red" in such 
circumstances. 
On the other hand, an organism's powers of discrimination could be 
so fine-grained, that they make it impossible for it to learn to attune its 
behavioural responses to comparatively coarse features of the environment. 
Thus imagine an organism with a remarkable sensitivity to colour. Each 
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of 75 shades of red affects it in a substantially different way, and these 75 
kinds of process don't have anything in common setting them apart from 
the many other neural processes that non-red colour shades trigger. One 
would expect hat this organism would have great difficulty in learning to 
behave in a certain way - e.g., producing an utterance of"red" - whenever 
a red object is present. 
These remarks are undoubtedly correct. It is true that not every neural 
configuration could give rise to the ability to utter "red" in the presence of 
red objects. But this is not to say that there cannot be several quite different 
types of configuration that could give rise to this ability. It doesn't establish, 
in particular, that Mary's neural configuration could not give rise to it. We 
can concede that it may be a little bit harder for Mary to learn to use "red" 
properly than for speakers on whose nervous ystems the perception of red 
objects causes uniform processes. But the difficulty would certainly not be 
insurmountable. All of us can, after all, perform the feat. We can easily 
learn to use a predicate that is applicable, say, to things that are red or 
square, even though, presumably, we would face the same difficulty with 
respect o this predicate that Mary faces with respect to "red". 
The second way in which one could try to defend the neural approach 
is to bite the bullet and argue that someone with Mary's neural constitution 
cannot make judgments that are satisfied precisely by red things. In par- 
ticular, the judgments that she expresses with utterances of "red" cannot 
have these satisfaction conditions, even if her use of the predicate is indis- 
tinguishable from that of speakers who regularly express uch judgments 
with their utterances of it. In other words, according to this approach, we 
should accept he idea that "red", as meant by Mary, is ambiguous between 
dark red and light red. 
I want to suggest that the account of meaning and judgment satisfaction 
that would arise from this response is at odds with our intuitions concerning 
the relationship between semantics and the neurological 'infrastructure'. 
We think that all of a speaker's utterances of"red" could express judgments 
with the same satisfaction conditions even if there are several different 
neurological processes that would lead from the perception of an object o 
an utterance of the predicate. In fact, there seem to be empirical masons 
for thinking that this is not an uncommon situation. I am thinking of results 
to the effect that "a given type of psychological process is in fact often 
associated with a variety of distinct neural structures". 21But it is hard to 
see why the situation would be substantially different if the various neural 
processes associated with a predicate failed to be nomically related to a 
unique property. 
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However, an account of the semantic relevance criterion that treats 
neural properties as semantically relevant cannot make room for this pos- 
sibility. On this kind of account, predicate utterances caused by different 
neural processes that don't bear the same nomic relations to the environ- 
ment couldn't express judgments with the same satisfaction conditions. 
Hence we have to conclude that this approach to the definition of the 
semantic relevance criterion cannot result in an adequate account of the 
expression relation. 
5. DISJUNCTIVE PROPERTIES 
The outcome of the previous ection still leaves the proponent of the infor- 
mation theoretic model some room for manoeuvre. We have concluded 
that neural properties cannot be expected to play the role of semantically 
relevant properties in each case. For in cases like Mary's "red"-judgments, 
this would result in incorrect assignments of satisfaction conditions. But 
even if neural properties cannot in general serve as semantically relevant, 
they can still play some role in singling out the expression relation. The 
reasoning would go as follows. Let SN be a second order property satisfied 
only by neural properties. Consider the relation EN that we can specify in 
terms of SN and a nomic relation: 
(8) For every predicative judgment j and property R EN(j, P) iff 
there is a property Q such that Q(j), SN(Q) and it is a law that 
Ps cause Qs under C-conditions. 
The outcome of the previous ection is that if we treat EN as the expression 
relation, we would render some predicative judgments atisfied by fewer 
objects than we should. For some predicative judgments are satisfied by 
objects that don't instantiate any of the properties to which they are EN- 
related. Thus, some of Mary's "red'-judgments can only be EN-related to 
dark red, but we want all red objects, dal~ and light, to fall under their 
extension. 
Notice, however, that as far as the outcome of the previous ection goes, 
treating EN as the expression relation may render predicative judgments 
satisfied only by objects by which they are, as a matter of fact, satisfied. 
None of Mary's "red"-judgments is satisfied only by dark red objects, but 
they are satisfied by all dark red objects. The extension that EN would 
assign to them will not coincide with their actual extension, but the former 
may be a subset of the lattel; In other words, EN cannot be expected to 
fulfil the following constraint: 
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(9) For every predicative judgment j, and every object x, if j is 
satisfied by x, then x instantiates a property to which j is EN- 
related, 
but it might fulfil its converse: 
(10) For every predicative judgment j, and every object x, if x instan- 
tiates a property to which j is EN-related, then j is satisfied by 
X. 
This may suggest a way of using neural properties in the specification 
of the expression relation that circumvents the difficulty raised in the 
previous ection. Neural properties cannot be expected, in general, to play 
the role of semantically relevant properties. But in cases in which they 
fail, disjunctions of neural properties may do the job. Thus I have argued 
that none of the neural properties n tantiated by Mary's "red"-judgments 
can act as their semantically relevant properties. Suppose, however, that 
each of them instantiates one of the neural properties RDARK and RLIGHT, 
such that dark red is nomically sufficient to cause RDARK tO be instantiated 
under C-conditions, and light red is nomically sufficient to cause RLI6nT 
tO be instantiated under C-conditions. Then the 'nomological pedigree' of 
RDARK and RLIGHT will include the nomological connections depicted in 
Figure 1, in which arrows represent causal laws linking the properties on 
both ends. 
dark  red  ...... 
l ight  red  ,, 
-~  RDARK 
RLIGHT - - I  
"red" 
Fig. 1 
Then, if we treat he disjunctive property RDARK-Or-RuGnT as the semanti- 
cally relevant property of each of Mary's "red"-judgments, wewill assign 
to them the right extension. 
Pursuing this strategy would involve two tasks. First, we would need 
an account of which neural properties of each predicative judgment can 
be used in this manner. Second, we would need an account of which 
disjunctions of these neural properties will do the job. Let's grant, for 
the sake of the argument, hat the first task can be accomplished. That is, 
suppose that we have specified a class of neural properties uch that the 
semantically relevant properties of each predicative judgment are to be 
found either among these properties or among disjunctions thereof. I want 
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to concentrate on the second task - that of providing an account of which 
disjunctions of neural properties are to be treated as semantically relevant 
in each case. 
The task is not a trivial one. For if our ultimate goal is a naturalization of 
the expression relation, this account would have to be constructed in non- 
semantic, non-intentional temls. In the case of Mary's "red'-judgments, 
we have seen that treating RDARK-Or-RLIGHT as the semantically relevant 
property of each of them would result in a correct ascription of satisfaction 
conditions. But the naturalist needs an account of why this is the right 
disjunction that doesn't make use of the fact that all of Mary's "red"- 
judgments have the same satisfaction conditions. 
6. FUNCTIONAL ROLES 
The most promising approach consists in appealing to thefuctional roles 
of neural properties. On this account, what enables us to choose RDARK- 
or-RLIGHT over the other possible candidates i  the fact hat RDARK and 
RLIGHT realize a functional role that other neural properties don't realize. 
Stephen Schiffer has provided avery accurate characterisation f the notion 
of functional role. He writes: 
A.functional role is simply any second-level property of first-level state-types possession 
of which entails that the state-type possessing it is causally or counterfactually related 
in a certain way to other state-types, to outputs, to inputs, or to distal objects and their 
properties. 22
Let's consider how functional roles would help us to define the semantic 
relevance criterion. Predicative judgments can be expected to enter in 
various kinds of causal relations. As we have seen, they are often caused 
by perceptual presentations of objects. They may also be caused by other 
predicative judgments, as when my judging of Fido that it is an animal 
is caused by my judging that it is a dog. They also cause other events, 
including other predicative judgments and certain sequences of behaviour, 
verbal and otherwise. 
The neural properties of predicative judgments can be expected to 
figure in some of the causal laws that cover these causal transactions. 
Thus, in Mary's case, dark ted is nomically sufficient to cause RDARK tO be 
instantiated under C-conditions, and RDARK is, in turn, nomically sufficient 
to cause "red" to be uttered under certain conditions. We may suppose also 
that RDARK bears nomic relations to other neural properties. The functional 
roles that might enable us to specify the right disjunctions are features of the 
nomological pedigree of neural properties. The proposal is to specify the 
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relevant disjunctions of neural properties in terms of similarities between 
their nomological pedigrees. 
Notice, however, that simply invoking functional roles does not provide 
us with a full account of how the task is to be accomplished. The problem is 
that each neural property realizes many functional roles. Suppose, e.g., that 
in Mary's case the nomological pedigree of RDARK is the one represented 
by Figure 2. 
dark red .... ~ RDARK ~ "red" 
Fig. 2 
Then RDARK will realize the functional role expressed by the open 
x is such that a presentation of a dark red object is nomically 
sufficient o cause x to be instantiated under C-conditions, A is 
nomically sufficient o cause x to be instantiated (under certain 
conditions), x is nomically sufficient o cause D to be instanti- 
ated (under certain conditions), and x is nomically sufficient o 
cause "rod" to be uttered (under certain conditions). 
But it will also realize the functional role expressed by 
(12) x is such that a presentation of a dark red object is nomically 
sufficient to cause x to be instantiated under C-conditions, B is 
nomically sufficient o cause x to be instantiated (under certain 
conditions), x is nomically sufficient to cause E to be instantiated 
(under certain conditions), and x is nomically sufficient to cause 
"red" to be uttered (under certain conditions), 
as well as many others. 
Our goal is to decide which disjunction of neural properties hould be 
treated as the semantically relevant property of instances of RDARK, and the 
present proposal is to specify' the relevant disjuncts as the ones that realize 
the same functional role as RDARK. But which disjunction weend up with 
is going to depend on which of the functional roles that RDARK realizes 
we use for this purpose. For we can expect, e.g., that the functional roles 
expressed by (11) and (12) will be realized by different classes of neural 
properties. Someone who wants to decide which disjunctions of neural 
sentence 
(11) 
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properties are semantically relevant by reference to the functional roles 
that they realize would have to provide a specification of which functional 
roles are to be used for this goal - of which functional roles of neural 
properties are semantically relevant. And, needless to say, if the ultimate 
goal is a naturalization of the expression relation, this account will have to 
be provided in non-semantic, non-intentional terms. 
We can take the task to consist in defining an equivalence relation on 
neural properties - "realizes the same semantically relevant functional rote 
as" - that satisfies the following constraint: 
(13) Neural properties ~ and ~ realize the same semantically rel- 
evant functional role iff for every predicative judgment j that 
instantiates cp or g,, and every distal property b that is nom- 
ically sufficient to cause either ~ or ~ to be tokened under 
C-conditions, j is satisfied by every instance of 6. 23 
Notice that RDARK and RLIGHT satisfy this criterion. Dark red is nomically 
sufficient o cause RDARK to be instantiated under C-conditions, and light 
red is nomically sufficient o cause RLIGHT tO be instantiated under C- 
conditions. And every instance of RDARK or RLIGHT (i.e., each of Mary's 
"red"-j udgments) is satisfied by every instance of dark red or light red (i.e., 
by all red objects). I shall refer to the equivalence relation that satisfies 
this constraint as the same role relation. My goal in the remainder of this 
paper is to argue that the task of defining the same role relation may prove 
quite hard to accomplish. In particular, I am going to suggest that the task 
may face a difficulty that would invalidate the whole information theoretic 
approach. 
7. THE PREEMPTION PROBLEM 
Let's consider once more the position that an account of the same role 
relation would occupy in the overall information theoretic project. The 
ultimate goal of the model is to provide an account of which properties are 
expressed by each predicative judgment. The basic idea of the information 
theoretic approach is to construct this account in terms of the nomological 
relations between properties of predicative j udgments and distal properties. 
But I have argued that a plausible account along these lines would have 
to introduce some restrictions on which properties of each predicative 
judgment are to be used in this manner. This is the goal that an account 
of the same role relation is expected to attain. The properties expressed by 
each predicative judgment will be singled out by the nomological relations 
of the disjunctive properties defined by the same role relation. 
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The fact that the same role relation is to be put to this use imposes an 
important constraint o  a satisfactory account of it. Suppose that the task 
of specifying the same role relation were just as difficult as the task of 
specifying the expression relation. That is, suppose that the facts that we 
need to invoke in the former task sufficed by themselves for determining 
which distal properties are expressed by each predicative judgment. In 
this situation, we would have to conclude that the information theoretic 
approach cannot succeed. For nomological relations cannot be used for 
specifying the expression relation until the same role relation has been 
construed. But if the facts that we need to invoke for specifying the same 
role relation sufficed for specifying the expression relation as well, the 
use of nomological relations would be preempted. We would only be able 
to specify the expression relation in terms of nomological relations if we 
already had a specification of it. The construal of the expression relation 
in terms of nomological relations would have to take as input what it is 
expected to deliver as output. 
Hence the viability of the information theoretic model rests on an impor- 
tant assumption. The task of specifying the same role relation has to be 
essentially easier than the task of specifying the expression relation, in the 
following sense: the facts that determine whether two neural properties 
and g~ realize the same semantically relevant functional role cannot suffice 
for determining as well which properties are expressed by the instances 
of c2 and g~. I shall refer to the challenge posed by this assumption as the 
preemption problem. I am going to consider the difficulties faced by the 
task of specifying the same role relation, and suggest that the preemption 
problem may pose a serious obstacle to the viability of the information 
theoretic model. 
In order to present he difficulties encountered by this task, I propose 
to look first at a crude account of the same role relation, and consider 
how it would have to be modified in order to become aplausible proposal. 
The basic thought of the crude account is that any difference between the 
nomic profiles of two neural properties will make them realize different 
semantically relevant functional roles. Thus, the crude account can be 
formulated as follows: 
(14) Neural properties ~, g,, realize the same semantically relevant 
functional role iff ~ and ~3 bear the same nomic relations to 
distal properties, to behavioural properties and to other neural 
properties. 
I want to argue that the crude account fails on all counts. A plausible 
account, I shall contend, will have to treat some neural properties as real- 
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izing the same semantically relevant functional role even if they bear 
different nomic relations to distal properties, to behavioural properties or 
to other neural properties. Let's consider each of these in tuna. 
7.t. Nomic Relations to Distal Properties 
Mary's case illustrates that a plausible account of the same role relation will 
have to count some neural properties that bear different nomic relations 
to distal properties as realizing the same semantically relevant functional 
role. As we saw, dark red, but not light red, is nomically sufficient o cause 
RDARK to be instantiated under C-conditions, and light red, but not dark 
red, is nomically sufficient o cause RLIGHT tO be instantiated under C- 
conditions. But I argued that a plausible account of the expression relation 
must have the resources for counting the disjunctive property RDARK-Or- 
RLtCnT as the semantically relevant property of instances of each of its 
disjuncts. Hence a plausible account of the same role relation would have 
to treat RDARK and RLIGHT as realizing the same semantically relevant 
functional role. 
This is not to say that none of the nomic relations that RDARK and RLIGHT 
bear to distal properties could enter in the definition of the semantically 
relevant functional role that they realize. The nomic relations that each 
of them bears to distal properties have many common features. And one 
may hope to find a non-semantic, non-intentional specification of which of 
these features hould figure in the definition of the semantically relevant 
functional role realized by RDARK and RLICHT. Notice, in p~ficular, that the 
nomic relations that RDARK and RLIGHT bear to distal properties have the 
following common feature: both are such that a shade of red is nomically 
sufficient o cause them to be instantiated under C-conditions. Presumably, 
this feature could enter into a successful definition of the semantically 
relevant functional role realized by RDARK and R~GH'r. In general, if P~ 
is the property expressed by instances of neural property ~, the following 
feature of ~'s nomological pedigree could play this role: 
(15) a certain kind of P~ is nomically sufficient o cause ~ to be 
instantiated under C-conditions. 
Hence it may seem that if we have a non-semantic, non-intentional way 
of specifying this feature in each case, we could use some of the nomic 
relations between eural properties and distal properties in the definition 
of the same role relation. 
Nevertheless, the possibility of using these nomic relations in the defi- 
nition of the same role relation is not good news for the proponent of the 
information theoretic model. The suggestion is that we could use some 
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nomic relations between eural properties and distal properties if we had 
a suitable specification, f r every neural property ~?, of the property P~ in 
(15). The problem is that providing this specification is precisely the ulti- 
mate goal that the information theoretic model is meant o attain. For P~ is 
the property that instances of ~ express. A specification of the semantically 
relevant functional role realized by ~ that invoked the feature expressed 
by (15) would fall prey to the preemption problem. Performing one of 
the subtasks that the information theoretic model involves would require 
having already the account that the model is meant o provide. Of course, 
it may turn out that the feature expressed by (15) is not the only feature of 
the nomic relations between p and distal properties that could figure in a 
successful definition of the semantically relevant functional role realized 
by ~. But if it were, then we would have to conclude that we can't use 
the nomic relations between eural properties and distal properties in the 
definition of the same role relation. 
7.2. Nomic Relations to other Neural Properties 
Nomic relations between eural properties pose a similar difficulty. I want 
to suggest that a plausible account of the same role relation would have 
to make room for the possibility that neural properties that bear different 
nomic relations to other neural properties realize the same semantically 
relevant functional role. Imagine, e.g., that in Mary's case there are two 
neural properties, A, B, that bear the same nomic relations to distal prop- 
erties, to behaviour and to other neural properties, except for the following 
difference: A is nomically sufficient o cause RDARK, but not RLICHT, to 
be instantiated (under certain conditions), and B is nomically sufficient to 
cause RLIGHT, but not RDARK, tO be instantiated (under those same condi- 
tions). I want to suggest that this difference between the nomic pedigrees 
of A and B should be treated as compatible with the possibility that A and 
B realize the same semantically relevant functional role. We want it to be 
possible for A-or-B to be the semantically relevant property of the pred- 
icative judgments that instantiate each of the disjuncts. This might be the 
right thing to say if, e.g., A and B have the nomological pedigree depicted 
in Figure 3, i.e., if both are nomically sufficient to cause "saturated red" to 
be uttered by Mary, and saturated red is nomically sufficient to cause both 
A and B to be instantiated under C-conditions. 
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saturated red 
m 
i~4~ " .,.~ 
"saturated red" 
B ~ RUGHT 
Fig. 3 
The same possibility would have to be available if A and B also bore 
different nomological relations to distal properties. Thus suppose that only 
dark saturated red is nomologically sufficient o cause A to be instantiated 
under C-conditions, and o ly light saturated red is nomologicatly sufficient 
to cause B to be instantiated under C-conditions: 
dark saturated red 
light saturated red 
RDARK 
B 
RLIGHT 
"saturated red" 
Fig. 4 
The same reasons that I adduced in support of the hypothesis that Mary's 
"red"-judgments express the property red would also lend support o the 
hypothesis that her "saturated red"-judgments express the property saturat- 
ed red. But that would seem to require treating A-or-B as tile semantically 
relevant property of the instances of each of the disjuncts. If this is correct, 
it follows that some differences in the nomic relations between eural prop- 
erties should not be counted as differences in their semantically relevant 
functional roles, even if combined with differences in their nomological 
relations to distal properties. We would want to say this whenever two 
neural properties bear otherwise identical nomic relations to two neural 
properties that realize the same semantically relevant functional role. 
7.3. Nomic Relations to Behaviour 
Let's now turn to nomic relations to behavioural properties. According to 
the crude account of the same role relation, two neural properties would 
be counted as realizing the same semantically relevant functional role only 
if they bore xactly the same nomic relations to behavioura] properties. ] 
am going to argue that this restriction is bound to result in unacceptable 
assignments of satisfaction conditions. The reason is that we cannot rule 
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out the possibility of nomic connections tobehavioural properties that are 
mere noise from the semantic point of view. 
Consider again Mary's case. WE said that a correct account of the 
semantic relevance criterion should treat he disjunctive property RDARK- 
or-RLIGHT as the semantically relevant property of each of her "red"- 
judgments. In order for the crude account of the same role relation to yield 
this assignment, RDARK and RLIGH T would have to stand in exactly the same 
nomic connections to behavioural properties. But it is perfectly possible 
that this i  not so. The behavioural sequences in which RDARK and RLIOnT 
issue cannot exhibit differences of a certain kind - of the kind that we 
consider relevant for semantic purposes. Otherwise we would presumably 
take Mary's "red"-judgments as having different satisfaction c ditions. 
But that they don't exhibit differences of that kind does not mean that they 
exhibit no differences at N1. Let's imagine, e.g., that hose of her utterances 
of"red" that are caused by instances Of RDARK are consistently louder than 
those that are caused by instances of RLICHT: 
dark  red  , , 
l i ght  red  
RDARK 
RLIGHT 
~,~loud "red" 
soft "red" 
Fig. 5 
We would want to count his difference as compatible with the hypoth- 
esis that all of the judgments hat she expresses with these utterances have 
the same satisfaction conditions. But the crude account of the same role 
relation would leave no room for this possibility. It would result in an 
account of the expression relation that ssigns different satisfaction condi- 
tions to each of them depending on which of the two neural properties they 
instantiate. Hence a plausible account of the same role relation must have 
the resources for counting some differences between the nomic relations 
that wo neural properties bear to behavioural properties as compatible with 
the hypothesis that they realize the same semantically relevant functional 
role. 
Nevertheless, some of the nomic relations that a neural property bears to 
behavioural properties could figure in a plausible definition of the seman- 
tically relevant functional role that it realizes. In Mary's case, we could 
use the property of being nomically sufficient to cause utterances of "red" 
under certain conditions in our definition of the semantically relevant func- 
tional role of RDARK and RLIGtfT- This approach would seem to yield the 
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right result in this case, if, as we are supposing, RDARK and RLIGHT are 
nomically sufficient o cause "red" to be uttered under certain conditions, 
and no other neural property bears this nomic relation to "red". 
This may seem to suggest a promising strategy for deciding which 
nornic relations to behaviour should enter into the definition of the same 
role relation. The idea would be to say that two neural properties realize the 
same semantically relevant functional role whenever they are nomically 
sufficient o cause the same predicate type to be uttered under certain 
conditions. But this strategy will not, in general, yield the right results. The 
proposal would fail in the case of ambiguous predicates. Thus consider 
the predicative judgments that I would express with utterances of "bank". 
Some of them express the property money-lending institution and others 
the property river side. We may suppose that judgments of the first kind 
instantiate a neural property, BMONEY, that bears the right nomic relation to 
the property money-lending institution, and that judgments of the second 
kind instantiate a neural property, BRtVER, that bears that nomic relation to 
the property Hver side. 
money-lending institution 
river side 
BMONEY 
BRIVER / 
"bank" 
Fig. 6 
If we treat two neural properties as realizing the same semantically rele- 
vant functional role whenever they are nomically sufficient o cause the 
same predicate type to be uttered (under certain conditions), BMONEy-Or- 
BRIVER will turn out to be the semantically relevant property of each of my 
"bank"-judgments. This would result in an inadequate account, since each 
of my "bank"-judgments would end up expressing the disjunctive property 
mo~wy-lending institution or river side. 
The strategy would only work if we defined predicate types in such a 
way that phonologically identical predicates that express different proper- 
ties are treated as type-distinct. But the naturalist cannot achieve this goat 
by stipulation. The criterion according to which different okens of "bank" 
are counted as type distinct cannot appeal to the fact that they express judg- 
ments with different satisfaction conditions. The naturalist would need a 
criterion in which only non-semantic, non-intentional facts are invoked. 
Providing an account of which behavioural types should be counted as 
semantically relevant is by no means a trivial task in the case of linguistic 
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behaviour. But the task would be even more complicated in the case of 
non-linguistic behaviour. The proponent of the information theoretic mod- 
el would have to provide an account of which properties of a subject's 
bodily motions are to be counted as relevant for semantic purposes. And 
this account would have to steer clear of the preemption problem. It could 
not invoke facts that would suffice for specifying which properties are 
expressed by the judgment that causes each behavioural sequence. 
8. CONCLUSION 
Let's consider where this leaves us. I have argued that in order to obtain 
an information theoretic account of the expression relation, one needs to 
provide first a semantic relevance criterion- an account of which properties 
of each predicative judgment are to be counted as semantically relevant. 
Then I have argued that their neural properties cannot be expected to 
do the job. A plausible account of the semantic relevance criterion must 
have the resources for treating as semantically relevant properties that 
are disjunctive from a neurological point of view. Hence the proponent 
of the information-theoretic model has to provide an account of which 
disjunctions of neural properties are to be treated as semantically relevant in 
each case. I have suggested that the most promising strategy for providing 
this account is to appeal to the functional roles realized by neural properties. 
But pursuing this strategy requires providing an account, in non-semantic, 
non-intentional terms, of which functional roles are semantically relevant. 
Finally I have argued that providing this account can be expected to be a 
non-trivial task. For not all the features of the nomic pedigrees of neural 
properties can be taken into account for this purpose. The information 
theoretic project could only succeed if there were a principled way of 
telling apart the features of nomic pedigrees that should be taken into 
account from those that shouldn't. We could help ourselves to semantic 
information for deciding which criterion will do the job, but it has to be 
possible to specify the criterion in non-semantic, non-intentional terms. 
Furthermore, the project would fail if specifying this criterion turned 
out to be just as difficult as deciding which property is expressed by each 
predicative judgment. If the information required for accomplishing the 
former task sufficed for accomplishing the latter, the information theoretic 
approach to the naturalization of the expression relation would have to be 
abandoned. For, in that case, providing an information theoretic account 
of the expression relation would require having already an account of the 
notion at our disposal. I have suggested that this may turn out to be the 
case. 
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Be this as it may, my main goal has been to argue that finding a suitable 
nomic relation is by no means the only substantial challenge that confronts 
the proponents of information theoretic semantics. In addition to that, they 
need to provide an account of which neural properties of each predicative 
judgment are to be counted for semantic purposes, and an account of which 
of these realize the same semantically relevant functional role. These tasks 
may tuna out to be feasible, but I suspect that they add up to a heavier burden 
than some proponents of the information theoretic model had bargained 
for. 
NOTES 
* I am indebted to Paul Boghossian, Allan Gibbard, Eric Lormand, Peter Railton, Gideon 
Rosen, Crispin Wright, and Steve Yablo for their comments on drafts of this paper. 
When several properties P1 . . . . .  P,~ play this role with respect to a predicative judgment, it
is satisfied by an object just in case the object instantiates one (or more) of these properties. 
Hence we can also speak of the satisfaction conditions of the judgment as being determined 
by the instantiation conditions of the disjunctive property P1 v - • • V P~. 
2 This is the term used by Fodor for the relation between a Mentalese predicate and the 
property that determines the satisfaction conditions of its tokens, Cf., e.g., Psychosemantics, 
p. 99, and 'A Theory of Content, I', p, 52. 
3 See, e.g., 'A Theory of Content, I', p. 52: 
[... ] recent developments in "informational" semantics suggest the possibility of a natu- 
ralistic atomistic theory of the relation that holds between a predicate and the property that 
it expresses, Such a theory would, of course, amount o a good deal tess than a complete 
understanding of intentionality. But it would serve to draw the skeptic's fangs since his line 
is that irreducibility and holism are intrinsic to intentionality and semantic evaluability, 
Given any suitably atomistic, suitably naturalistic break in the intentional circle, it would 
be reasonable to claim that the main philosophical problem about intentionality had been 
solved. 
4 CL, e.g., Psychosemanfics, p. 97: 
It is hard to see [... ] how one can be a Realist about intentionality without also being, to 
some extent or other, a Reductionist. If the semantic and the intentional are real properties 
of things, it must be in virtue of their identity with (or maybe of their supervenience on?) 
properties that are themselves neither intentional nor semantic. If aboutness i  real, it must 
be really something else. 
Fodor has recently toned down his commitment to this kind of reductionism. Cf. his reply 
to Boghossian in 'Replies', pp. 271-72, 
5 See his 'Psychosemantics, or: Where Do Truth Conditions Come From?', for an early 
proposal. In Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind, he 
launched a new proposal that is further developed in °% Theory of Content, IF'. 
e, It is a central aspect of Fodor's picture tha{ beliefs, desires, and other propositional 
attitudes are to be seen as different ways of tokening the same mental (type) expressions. 
Thus, my believing of my car that it is dirty, and my wishing that it were dirty would 
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involve two different ways of tokening the same mental predicate. Cf. Psychosemantics, p. 
17. 
7 Cf., e.g., Psychosemantics, p. 98. 
8 Cf. the Appendix to Psychosemantics for a discussion of what this second claim comes 
to. 
9 For an early defence of the information theoretic model, see D. Stampe, "Toward a 
Causal Theory of Linguistic Representation'. Another milestone in the information theoretic 
program is Fred Dretske's Knowledge and the Flow ~?f lnformation. 
i0 Throughout this paper, I shall assume that token physicalism is correct. In particular, 
I shall assume that every predicative judgment is (token-)identical with an event in the 
subject's nervous ystem. 
11 See Fodor, Psychosemanties, pp. 1 12-14, for a defence of the fundamental status of these 
cases. 
12 Or rather, as Fodor puts it, to the property of tokening that predicate (Cf. Psychosemantics, 
p. 99). This is the shape both of his early proposal in 'Psychosemantics' and of the more 
recent one in Psychosemantics and 'A Theory of Content, II'. 
13 Cf. Psyehosemantics, pp. 99-102. 
14 I shall follow Fodor's orthographic convention and use italics to name properties. Cf. 
Fodor, Psychosemantics, p. 160, fn. 5. 
~5 Cf. 'A Theory of Content, I', p. 60. 
~6 Cf. 'A Theory of Content, lI', p. 90. Paul Boghossian has contested this claim. Cf. his 
~Naturalizing Content', pp. 71-73. 
17 Throughout this paper, I am assuming an account of events according to which they are 
not individuated in terms of properties. Donald Davidson has defended such an account. Cf. 
his 'The Individuation of Events'. For the opposing view, see, e.g., Jaewon Kim, 'Events as 
Property Exemplifications'. My argument could bereformulated in terms of a conception 
of events as property exemplifications. Then the problem would not be to identify the 
properties of a predicative judgment hat are to be treated as semantically relevant, but 
rather to identify the event hat each predicative judgment is identical with. 
18 Cf. Psychosemantics, p. 17. 
19 (7) is a trivial instance of (5). 
2o Of course, the satisfaction conditions of a predicative judgment need not coincide with 
the applicability conditions of the English predicate with which the speaker attempts to 
express it, as malapropisms illustrate. However, it seems natural to treat the notion of the 
satisfaction conditions of the judgment as identical with the notion of the applicability 
conditions of the predicate as meant by the speaker at the time of utterance. 
21 N. J. Block and J. A. Fodor, 'What Psychological States Are Not', p. 160. 
22 S. Schiffer, Remnants of Meaning, p. 21. As Schiffer goes on to suggest, "each functional 
role determines a unique functional property, viz., the property of having some property 
which has that functional role" (Ibid.). 
23 In fact, a somewhat weaker constraint would be more accurate. The idea would be to 
keep the 'only if' part of (13): 
(13".1) Neural properties ~ and (, realize the same semantically relevant functional 
role only if for every predicative judgment j that instantiates ~ or ~,, and 
every distal property ~ that is nomically sufficient to cause either ~ or ~/, to be 
tokened under C-conditions, j is satisfied by every instance of 5, 
and to replace the 'if '  part by: 
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(13'.2) For every neural property ~p, and every object x that satisfies the instances of 
~, there is a property ~, such that fi(x), and for some neural property ~ that 
realizes the same semantically relevant functional role as ~p, fi is nomieally 
sufficient o cause ~b to be tokened under C-conditions. 
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